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2What long-term lessons can we draw from the corona 
crisis? Which ones must we draw?
Many say that our way of life has changed so much that 
there will be a time before and a time after this crisis. For 
me, there is a distinction between values and behaviours. 
There is, undoubtedly, a kind of togetherness between 
people, grown out of the feeling that we are all in the 
same boat. A lot of creative energy has been released. 
Digitisation has prevented us from becoming alienated 
from each other. Social media have shown that they don’t 
just polarise. Their positive uses have made the new 
media truly social. We have also learned that we can meet 
remotely, collaborate and be productive.
There are, of course, underlying inequalities in the way we 
can protect and isolate ourselves. But nobody is truly safe, 
and there are also a few ‘big names’ among the victims.
Conversely, in addition to connectedness, distrust has 
also grown. These days people look at each other too 
much as potential carriers of infection. Foreigners 
are often considered more dangerous than fellow 
countrymen. At the beginning of the crisis, Asians, 
and in particular the Chinese, were viewed with great 
suspicion in the West. Now, it could be the other way 
around. Let’s hope it is transient. Let us also hope that 
the rediscovery of connection is not! After all, once 
the crisis is over, daily life will absorb us again and 
the ‘rat race’ will resume. Hopefully, there will also be 
something left of the slower and more conscious life, 
of living together. ‘My world may have flipped, but my 
priorities are falling back into order’: wise words from 
an unknown older man.
There is undoubtedly a lot of solidarity among 
populations, but too much is focused only on 
people of the same nation or tribe. Cross-border 
solidarity that requires a greater effort, that points 
to the transcendence of one’s own ego, is much more 
difficult. The painful discussion in the European Union 
(EU) about the willingness to help, and under what 
conditions, is unfortunately an illustration of this.
This crisis is about life and death. Had we done nothing, 
the cost of human life would have been enormous, many 
times higher than what a normal winter flu brings.
A virus emerges somewhere in the world and every 
country is on its knees. We’ve become so interdependent 
and so vulnerable.
Among populist forces we have witnessed different 
reactions to this pandemic. A number of parties sided 
with health, because a populist wants to be popular. 
Others took advantage of a new external enemy – the 
virus – to expand their political power. Still others first 
gave the impression of choosing money over human lives 
– a real conflict of values – but they were unable to hold 
out for long. But for those populists, it was about more 
than economics. The primacy of politics had to give way 
to experts and scientists, until recently presented by them 
as unworldly and irrelevant. How hollow the slogan to 
‘take back control’ sounds! The crisis also spiralled out of 
control in countries ruled by populists. The heroes are not 
the new populist elite, but doctors, care workers and other 
ordinary men and women who, at great personal risk, save 
lives and keep society running.
Once again, the facts are the ideologists’ greatest enemy.
The opponents of a strong and big government are 
waning. Only governments can turn the tide. The 
markets are wavering. Private investors are paralysed 
with uncertainty and fear. Protecting everyone is 
ultimately a task for the government.
The most basic function of the state, to protect the life 
and limb of its citizens, is back to the fore.
Monetary and budgetary policy are now working together 
in one direction. The ‘frugals’ are opening all the taps in 
their own country, but tend to refuse to do so for other 
countries – even within a political entity like the EU. Who 
dares to ask for austerity today? Who would dare to repeat 
the past savings in health care? If savings are needed later, 
everyone now knows where not to cut and where to invest. 
It is a question of priorities and therefore of values. This 
does not mean that efficiency gains should not be made 
in the medical sector as well. And if there is a shortage of 
money, more must be contributed if necessary. More than 
ever, it will be about the just distribution of the burden. 
The question of taxing companies that pay little or no 
tax will be more pressing than ever. A tax on large digital 
companies is a must. Obamacare will only be a start in the 
USA, Trump or no Trump. We have now discovered that 
among us there are many Dr. Schweitzers, Father Damiens 
or Florence Nightingales.
The enemies of the EU have a point when they ask where 
the Union was at the beginning of the crisis. The answer 
is paradoxical and simple: yes, there was too little EU; 
but that is because it is not a superstate! Even though the 
Union has no competences in health or social matters, 
everyone expected that there would be much more 
coordination on the necessary restrictive measures. And, 
once again, one already sees purely national strategies for 
the exit from quarantine.
Those working on the new Conference on the Future of 
Europe should realise that many citizens would have 
preferred ‘more Europe’ to today’s patchwork.
Economically, the EU and the eurozone will have to be 
much more relevant, if only because 19 out of 27 countries 
have a single currency. All of them will be dragged into the 
post-corona depression, which will strike harder in some 
countries than in others. Some countries will have to give 
up illusions. The ‘strong countries’ were not so strong 
before February 2020. Economic growth in Germany was 
the lowest in the eurozone, with the exception of Italy.
The overall impact of national fiscal stimulus measures 
is much greater when taken in a coordinated manner at 
European level. Certainly, in small economies that are 
more open than larger countries, a budgetary stimulus is 
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not be the last one. I’ve heard some people say: ‘Italy has no 
and will not have liquidity problems, so there is no need to 
consider even more far-reaching measures’. But are we going 
to wait as we did in the Greek crisis? Will we wait again for 
the verdict of the financial markets? The past has taught 
us that even bolder compromises were only possible ‘with 
the back against the wall, the abyss in front of our eyes and 
the knife at our throats’. This time we need to anticipate 
and prepare for the next phase. Apparently, we’re working 
on that. ‘If we really ever need anything bolder, I’m sure we 
will succeed.’ An old friend with an impressive record in the 
Union confided it to me. Time also should be allowed to do 
its work to bring minds and interests together.
However, the debate within the eurozone is much more 
emotional now than it was ten years ago. The ghosts 
from the beginning of the polycrisis have resurfaced. I 
sometimes have the impression that some of them are 
still in the trenches of a war we thought had passed. 
The dividing lines also run right through the European 
political parties, even among the populists. The patience 
of the ‘South’ is gone. We cannot live for a long period in 
that climate, as we did during the eurozone crisis. A great 
responsibility rests once again on France and Germany. 
They played their role in the final stage leading to the 
recent compromise. Some Visegrád countries cannot hold 
up progress if a compromise is found, as three out of the 
four are outside the eurozone.
One of the instruments to address the impact of the crisis 
should be the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). 
The European budget, the MFF, is of course ridiculously 
small: between one fiftieth and one fortieth of the total 
public spending of all governments in the Union. There 
is no bazooka hidden within it. But, yet again, there was 
no agreement in February 2020 on the next MFF. The 
Commission is right when it says it will come up with a 
revised budget proposal in the light of the double crisis 
we are currently experiencing: the pandemic and the 
economic depression. The hypotheses on which previous 
proposals were based are no longer valid. This time, when 
the European Council meets on this issue, we must be sure 
to succeed. If not, the current budget will have to run for an 
extra year.
The firepower of the European budget can be enhanced 
if the EU has the possibility to borrow. The Juncker 
Plan was a creative idea. It worked on the principle of 
underwriting risk, so the funding comes from the private 
sector and/or national authorities. The funds of the EIB, 
backed by a provision in the EU budget, are there to take 
the first tranche of losses. The proposed Recovery Fund 
will mobilise future-oriented investment and help spread 
the costs of the extraordinary crisis over time through 
appropriate financing. Some member states were of the 
view that it should be based on common debt issuance, 
while others advocated alternative solutions, in particular 
in the context of the multiannual financial framework. 
These are investments for which even Adam Smith thought 
it was responsible to borrow!
Without more economic growth, private and public debt 
will become unmanageable. We must, of course, hope 
‘leaking’ to a good extent through, among other things, 
increased imports.
The European Central Bank (ECB) had to, and is doing all 
it can, again. This new Pandemic Emergency Purchase 
Programme (PEPP) will have an overall envelope of €750 
billion. The central bank will do whatever is necessary, 
within its mandate. It is fully prepared to increase the 
size of its asset purchase programmes and adjust their 
composition, by as much as necessary and for as long as 
needed. It cannot be said that the ECB is acting ‘too little 
and too late’. Some said before the corona crisis that the 
central bank had nothing left in its toolbox. They were 
wrong. Those who feared more inflation in recent years 
after the expansionary monetary policy of recent years 
have had to conclude that this did not result in more 
inflation – on the contrary.
The crisis response will not succeed without European 
coordination and solidarity. As in the years 2010-2013, 
we will achieve solidarity not for ethical reasons but 
because the enlightened national interests of a number of 
countries ultimately coincide with the European interest. 
It takes a while before this insight matures. But we cannot 
wait two and a half years to make that decision, as we did 
then. Fortunately, the non-empathic statements made by 
EU institutions and some member states were so poorly 
received that the authors had to make adjustments. These 
errors are at the root of changes in a positive direction! 
For those who had forgotten, this crisis is a reminder of 
the existence of a European public space.
The compromise reached in the Eurogroup is proof that we 
have drawn lessons from the past. The three new EU safety 
nets (ECB, EIB, EMS) add up to around half a trillion euros.
As usual, we will go from compromise to compromise. 
The question is whether and when the answer will be 
sufficient. Taboos have already perished at the national 
level, such as the obsession with absolute budget equilibra. 
At the European level, the Stability and Growth Pact has 
been temporarily pushed aside and the ECB will run up 
even more massive public debt. These European taboos 
are being shattered. White Thursday’s recent compromise 
includes another breakthrough. The SURE programme 
proposed by the Commission to help f.i. member states 
finance temporarily reduced working time is a step in the 
direction of a unemployment reinsurance system that is 
part of any genuine economic and monetary union. It was 
presented in a broader sense in the four presidents’ report 
in 2012. ESM loans for domestic financing of direct and 
indirect healthcare, cure and prevention related costs due 
to the COVID-19 crisis, are also a novelty. Especially if 
macroeconomic conditionality does not apply. The amount 
can be 2% of the respective member’s GDP as of end-2019.
However, public debt in Italy and other countries should 
not spiral out of control, because then, not only one 
country would have a problem, but the eurozone as a 
whole. Lending more to that country via the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) or other funds is therefore not 
enough. The idea of forms of temporary solidarity derives 
from this observation. The Recovery Fund i.a. can play an 
important role.
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depression of 2020. It is not impossible. Surely, we are not 
going to do as we did after the financial crisis, where the 
European Council at the end of 2008 first decided on a 
budgetary injection of 1.5% of GDP and one year later on 
fiscal consolidation. It is not forbidden to learn from the 
past. We have already seen a rapid, massive, co-ordinated 
impulse from the monetary and fiscal authorities and from 
regulators: nearly 3% GDP of fiscal measures on top of the 
impact of automatic stabilisers. A one-time breakdown can 
be offset by a one-time injection. In the long run, economic 
growth cannot come from demand alone. Without stronger 
productivity, there can be no stronger GDP growth. Italy, 
like the UK, has been struggling with this for decades.
If the euro area does not achieve better macroeconomic 
balance, it is under threat. Countries cannot have current 
account surpluses that go to 10% of GDP, albeit vis-
à-vis the rest of the world. If there were still national 
currencies, these surpluses would disappear due to a 
revaluation of those currencies. But because we only have 
one currency, they will continue to exist. In a way, the 
surpluses of one currency are also the deficits of another. 
During the eurozone crisis, we had set up a mechanism 
to avoid such a situation. It turned out to be a dead letter. 
That too is a lesson.
At the same time, but unlike in 2008, we are witnessing 
a ‘my country comes first’ approach around the globe. 
The climate was already soured by the USA’s useless 
trade war with China, and even partly with the EU. It was 
a capital blunder. Brexit also took us further away from 
international cooperation. How can a country be against 
protectionism when it is prepared to impose tariffs on the 
goods and services of its largest trading partner?
The pandemic is a global phenomenon, which should lead 
to a higher level of international cooperation. The G20 
finance ministers did not agree on a joint text a few weeks 
ago because the current administration in the USA insisted 
that China should be blamed for the current crisis. The 
G20 has definitively become an empty box. It had already 
been downgraded to a discussion forum beforehand, far 
removed from the original idea of a global policy centre. 
After 2008, the G20 never found its élan again. Only the 
Paris Climate Conference (December 2015) was a bright 
spot in multilateralism. However, the economic depression 
will not make countries more climate-friendly. I fear that 
the old trade-off between ecology and economy will be 
brought back to life. Perhaps it’s not a bad thing that the 
COP-26 has been postponed for a while so that the long-
term climate objectives can once again receive sufficient 
attention. And yet we must continue with the Green Deal. 
The relaunch of the economy through investment in 
energy and climate fits perfectly into that major project. It 
would be a break with the traditional recovery programmes 
of the past, which were not inspired by sustainability.
Generally speaking, in the future, the world will have to 
deal even more with exogenous developments, such as 
climate change and pandemics. The devastating fires in 
Australia and the COVID-19 pandemic teach us that the 
exception is almost becoming the rule. Crises are not just 
endogenous, specific to our individual economic, political 
or societal systems. Disruptions are not just technological, 
like the digital revolution. Disruption exists on all levels. It 
will make our populations even more anxious and insecure. 
Vulnerable to reason after the traumas of the last few 
months or susceptible to emotions? Long term or short 
term? Stability or adventure? Solidarity or tribalism? How 
to prepare for new crises if there is no more solidarity in 
society and political courage at national and European 
among leaders? The EU institutions have their role as 
engines but they cannot do anything without the  
member states. France and Germany continue to carry  
a major responsibility.
But do not think that authoritarian regimes will come 
out of this crisis strengthened. In China and Russia, too, 
the crisis has provoked a major internal debate that is 
not public, of course, but nevertheless real. Russia finds 
itself in a chaotic medical situation, in stark contrast to 
its so-called geopolitical ambitions. In addition, how 
does the Russian economy deal with the extremely low 
current oil prices on which the country is so dependent? 
Would an export-oriented Chinese economy benefit from 
a world economy in depression? China will also discover 
that Western countries will rethink their production 
chains and will no longer want to be dependent on a 
single supplier in strategic sectors. They will want to keep 
more strategic activities in Europe in their own hands. 
The world will not de-globalise economically, but there 
will now be a greater tendency to emphasise strategic 
autonomy. Private companies in the West that usually 
look for the cheapest solution and do not care much 
about geopolitics have learned their lesson.
If one wants to make a comparison between authoritarian 
regimes and democracies in terms of corona crisis 
management, one has to conclude that there are also 
differences in the performance of the latter. What is it due 
to? Germany is doing better than many other countries, 
including northern countries. That may also be said. 
“Gouverner, c’est prévoir”. “To govern is to plan”.
The EU as a whole must be much more sovereign in the 
economic, technological, energy, medical and agricultural 
fields. We must also protect our external borders better, 
also in the name of sovereignty. Another theme for the 
Conference on the Future of Europe. If not, we cannot 
‘protect’ our citizens sufficiently, a primary task of any 
political system. Many are even more convinced of this in 
these times of quarantine.
In the midst of the tragedy of tens of thousands of deaths, 
we must continue to hope that we will learn lessons to 
avoid repetition. Hope, however, is a verb. How to turn 
fear into hope? Politics is action.
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